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Over the last two decades, cellular telephones have become a mainstay of the 
U.S. telecommunications industry. They already almost outnumber traditional 
land lines, l and may exceed them in the near future - a situation which has 
encouraged a substantial amount of new entrance.2 
Another, less familiar, and somewhat untested form of wireless is "wi-fi,"3 
which primarily transmits broadband data among computers. Although wi-fi 
has been in existence for a decade,4 its applications generally have been confined 
to small businesses - i.e., waiting rooms and coffee shops - or homes. Only 
over the last few years has there been any impetus to offer it to the population at 
large. 
The logical initial entrants into wi-fi might have been the existing cellular 
operators, which had operating experience, antenna sites, and customers. In-
stead, local governments were the first to show a significant interest in the wi-fi 
market - albeit usually with private sector partners. This has provoked con-
siderable legal and policy backlash on both the state and federal levels, which does 
not seem close to resolution. 
I. BACKGROUND 
As indicated, wi-fi is a radio frequency service, operating above UHF tele-
vision and below satellite television.s Unlike most other radio frequency services, 
use of wi-fi requires no license from the Federal Communications Commission 
("FCC"), but instead compliance with general requirements to avoid interference 
with existing operations.6 While compliance with several different technical 
standards is acceptable, the most common one is the "802.11 Protocol" and its 
1. U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n, Telecom Statistics, http://www.usta.org//index.php?urh=home.news.telecom_stats 
(last visited Aug. 27, 2006). For residential users, at of the end of 2005, 107 million households had one 
or more telephone lines, while 203.7 million individuals had cellular service. These statistics exclude 
business customers. The attraction is obviously not limited to the United States. See Damien Cave, 
Must Haves: Cellphones Top Iraqi Cool List, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,2006, at Al (noting that one-third 
of the Iraqi population has cellular telephones, and the market is growing quickly). 
2. Matt Richtel & Ken Belson, Cable and Satellite TV Set Their Sights on Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 2006, at C8. 
3. The acronym derives from nothing, though after the fact it was claimed to come from "wireless fidelity" -
a completely meaningless term. See A Brief History of Wi-Pi, ECONOMIST, June 10, 2004, at 27. 
4. Backgrounder, Inst. of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc., The IEEE 802 LANIMAN Standards 
Committee (Feb. 18, 2005), http://standards.ieee.org/announcementslbkgnd_802stds.html [hereinafter 
IEEE Standards]' In 1997, the IEEE promulgated the first of several standards for the wireless trans-
mission of data. Since the IEEE is a private non-profit body, its action did not by itself allocate any radio 
frequency spectrum for wi-fi. Ultimately, however, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") 
set aside two frequency bands for wi-fi use under a variety of standards - primarily the IEEE's. 47 
C.F.R. § 15.247 (2006). 
5. In 1989, the FCC created two new bands for shared communication without the usual license required by 
broadcast or telecommunications entities. After the IEEE's adoption of the first wi-fi standards - known 
as the "802.11 Protocol" - the FCC accepted that as one of several different technical configurations for 
use in the 2.4 and 5.0 gigahertz bands. See IEEE Standards, supra note 4. 
6. 47 C.F.R. § 15.247 (2006). 
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successors, adopted by the Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers, Inc. 
("IEEE").7 In 1999, a number of telecommunications companies formed the Wi-
Fi Alliance, which runs a "certification program" to approve compatible and se-
cure wi-fi technologies. 8 
As discussed later, wi-fi can transmit video and voice, as well as data.9 For 
the moment, however, its primary application is data transmission, usually be-
tween computer users and internet service providers or data bases. 
Wi-fi has increasingly become part of a national communications policy de-
bate over the extent of broadband telecommunications development in the United 
States. Some observers argue that the country has fallen behind both developed 
and developing countries in deployment of broadband, thus ultimately impairing 
its international competitiveness. lO 
This became a major issue as a result of a report of the Oganisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD").n In December of 2005, 
an OECD study found that the United States ranked twelfth out of its thirty 
member states - mainly developed nations - in terms of percentage of 
broadband penetration among inhabitants.12 The United States had an average 
penetration of 16.8%, as compared to 26.7% for Iceland, 25.4% for Korea, 25.3% 
for the Netherlands, 23.1% for Switzerland, and 22.5% for Finland.13 This has 
caused considerable consternation in U.S. financial as well as political sectors.14 
Although the OECD's statistics were technically correct, the reactions to 
them may have been unduly dire. In most of its member states, broadband is 
delivered by a digital subscriber line ("DSL"), a digital connection offered by local 
telephone companies. In the United States, however, most residential broadband 
services traditionally have been offered by cable modems over cable television 
systems. Traditionally, cable penetration has been much lower than telephone 
7. See IEEE Standards, supra note 4. The IEEE has a program for creating standards in a variety of 
electronic technologies. IEEE, IEEE Standards, http://www.ieee.org/web/standards/home/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2006). 
8. Wi-Fi Alliance, Get to Know the Alliance, http://www.wifialliance.comiaboucoverview.php (last visited 
Aug. 28. 2006). 
9. See infra text accompanying note 34. 
10. See, e.g., 151 CONGo REC. S7296, 98 (daily ed. June 23, 2005) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg for himself 
and Sen. McCain). Senator McCain's comments related to his co-sponsorship with Senator Frank 
Lautenberg of New Jersey of the Community Broadband Act of2005, S. 1294, 109th Congo § 1 (1st Sess. 
2005), which is discussed infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
11. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization consisting of thirty countries, including the United 
States, which develops economic and social policies for use by governments as a way to make progress in 
the globalized economy. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., http://www.oecd.org (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2006) [hereinafter OECD]. 
12. OECD, BROADBAND STATISTICS TO JUNE 2006 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/stilictlbroadband. 
13. !d. 
14. See supra note 10 (discussing S. 1294). 
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subscription (about sixty-five percent as opposed to more than ninety percent).15 
Moreover, a cable modem is generally more expensive than a digital subscriber 
line. Thus, it is less than surprising that broadband penetration is lower in the 
United States than in many other countries.16 This situation is likely to change 
in the relatively near future, however, if the remaining major Regional Bell 
Operating Companies ("RBOCs") are successful in deploying fiberoptics to the 
home - AT&T's "Lightspeed" and Verizon's "FIOS"; both of these systems 
have broadband capabilityP 
Although the OECD report has been a bit of a cause celebre recendy, the 
availability of broadband does seem to have a substantial impact on economic 
growth. A recent econometric study by four leading economists indicates the 
availability of broadband leads to faster economic growth, higher employment, 
and increased real estate value.18 The researchers used U.S. Census data on busi-
ness activity from the 1990s through 2002 with a "broadband availability indi-
cator" based on information derived from the FCC's Form 477 reports, on a zip-
code basis. There was an extremely positive correlation between broadband de-
ployment and levels of employment - although not wages. The same results 
basically pertained to rent (as a measurement of real estate values) and local 
increase in information-technology based business. 
The OECD study19 may understate the competitiveness of U.S. broadband 
industries - and hence of dependent businesses - simply because it is always 
difficult to measure competitiveness on an international level, and particularly 
with quickly developing industries such as telecommunications.20 Nevertheless, it 
makes a point worth considering. Similarly, the economic analysis of broadband's 
15. u.s. cable penetration is nevertheless much higher than in other nations, except for some of the Northern 
Countries in Europe. See OECD, supra note 11. 
16. In fact, one of the ongoing puzzles here is that the U.S. telephone and cable companies had committed in 
the early 1990s to implement a new "National Information Infrastructure" - more commonly known as 
the "electronic superhighway." For possibly technological or economic reasons, they never moved in that 
direction. See Michael Botein, The Demise of the Electronic Superhighway, 11 MEDIA L. & POL'y 
85 (2003). 
17. E.g., Linda Haugsted, Phone Key to Bundle, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 20, 2006, at 24; David 
Kocieniewski, New Jersey to Let Phone Companies Become Pay Television Providers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 5, 2006, at Bl. 
18. William H. Lehr, Carlos A. Osorio, Sharon E. Gillett & Marvin A. Sirbu, Measuring Broadband's 
Economic Impact, BROADBAND PROPERTIES, Dec. 2005, at 12, availableat http://www.broadband 
properties.coml2005issuesidec05issuesldec2005.php. An earlier and lengthier version of the piece was 
presented at the 33rd Research Conference on Communication, Information, and Internet Policy (TPRC), 
Sept. 23-25, 2005, in Arlington, VA. 
19. See OECD, supra note 12. 
20. See, e.g., Michael Botein & Alan Pearce, The Competitiveness of the Us. Telecommunications 
Industry: A New York Case Study, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.]. 233 (1988). 
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economic impact does not pretend to be definitive, but rather it tends to confirm 
intuitive notions that broadband enhances a variety of economic factors.21 
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF WHI 
These concerns about the competitiveness of U.S. industries in terms of 
broadband led to a perhaps unexpected response from city governments. After the 
telecoms and cable industries declined to move forward with the "electronic super-
highway" during the 1990s,22 city governments undertook the role of creating 
their own wi-fi networks. There were several reasons for this. 
First, wi-fi was the least expensive form of broadband to build, as it did not 
require extensive underground fiberoptic and other conduits. In most cases, the 
radio frequency antennas can simply be attached to existing street lamps, which 
provide electric power. For example, the city of Taipei, Taiwan has extended 
broadband wi-fi to more than ninety percent of its geographic area.23 The same 
strategy naturally also applies to U.S. cities, and a number have followed a simi-
lar technological approach. 
Second, this alternative catered to partnerships with private sector entities. 
From the beginning, cities recognized they lacked the expertise and capital to 
build wi-fi networks by themselves. They almost universally have struck deals 
with telecommunications companies to build and operate systems for them on an 
exclusive basis. Examples of these partnerships include Earthlink in Philadel-
phia, SBS Communications as well as Cisco Systems in Milwaukee,24 and Uni-
President, Inc., in Taipei.25 
This approach is somewhat similar to traditional municipal franchising of 
cable television. In those situations, however, the local government usually does 
not attempt to operate a system at all, but instead chooses a private 
entrepreneur.26 
This environment might be attractive to private telecommunications com-
panies, since it allows them to participate fully in wi-fi's economic development. 
21. A similar study used a smaller study to reach much the same conclusion as to economic impact. George S. 
Ford & Thomas M. Loutsky, Broadband and Economic Development: A Municipal Case Study from 
Florida, 17 REV. URB. & REGIONAL DEV. STUD. 216 (2005), available at http://www.aestudies.coml 
library.econdev.pdf. Aside from the size of the sample, it relied almost exclusively on state-level data. 
22. See Botein, supra note 16, at 85-89. 
23. Taipei City Government, Growing an Intelligent Community, http://english.taipei.gov.tw/ICF/index. 
jsp?categid=5311 (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). 
24. COMM. ON TECH. IN GOv'T & COMM. ON PARKS & RECREATION, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, OVERSIGHT: 
\ViRELESS INTERNET SERVICE IN PuBLIC PARKS 4 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/ 
attachments/72530.htm?CFID=1130470&CFTOKEN=70214294. The City Council had begun limited 
wi-fi deployment in a few city parks with a small company, Wi-Fi Salon, because it was the only respon-
dent to a June 2003 request for proposals. Id. at 5. 
25. Taipei City Government, supra note 23. 
26. MICHAEL BOTEIN, FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 181 (3d ed. 1998). 
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Nevertheless, it immediately drew 0ppositlOn from the two largest remammg 
RBOCs, Verizon27 and AT&T.28 There are at least two possible reasons for 
their positions. 
First, as the "legacy" U.S. local telecommunications carriers, Verizon and 
AT&T may view wi-fi as just an extension of their existing local service - such 
as DSL. The puzzling aspect of this analysis, however, is that in the past, 
neither company showed much interest in the broadband market, with DSL al-
most as an afterthought in light of the cable modem's success. As noted before, 
despite their promise to participate in the Clinton Administration's "electronic 
superhighway,"29 none of the RBOCs played an active role. One observer noted 
that this resulted from the "monopolistic structure, entrenched management, and 
political power" of the RBOCS.30 As the N ew York City Council recendy noted, 
both the telecommunications and cable industries have been less than aggressive 
in marketing DSL or cable modems.31 The reasons for the RBOCs' traditional 
lack of interest in broadband may range from marketing inexperience to limited 
capital,32 particularly in light of recent test deployment of Verizon's FIOS and 
AT&T's Lightspeed systems.33 
A second explanation may be that even if the RBOCs are not particularly 
interested in developing wi-fi, they may fear that the new medium will poach on 
their cellular radio businesses. These have been enormously profitable - in 
many cases making the difference between profit and loss for RBOCs. As noted 
before,34 so far wi-fi has been used only to transmit data. At least in theory, 
however, it also can accommodate video and voice. This would allow cities and 
their commercial partners to offer cellular services in direct competition with the 
RBOCs - from an RBOC's perspective using an extension of its local telecom-
munications legacy. 
Regardless of the reasons, municipal wi-fi entry has touched off a full-scale 
conflict. To date, it has involved state legislatures, the Congress, and the federal 
courts. There is litde likelihood of a resolution in the near future. 
27. Verizon is comprised primarily of the old NyNex and New Jersey Bell. 
28. By far the largest of the remaining RBOCs, AT&T is an amalgam of SBC and BellSouth. 
29. Botein, supra note 16. 
30. Charles H. Ferguson, The U.S. Broadband Problem, BROOKINGS INST. POL'y BRIEF (Brookings Insti-
tution, Washington, D.C.), July 2002, at 1. The author goes on to note that the RBOCs "engage in 
virtually no research and development .... However, their political spending has increased sharply .... " 
Id. at 3. 
31. CoMM. ON TECH. IN GOYT & COMM. ON PARKS & RECREATION, supra note 24. 
32. See id. 
33. See Kocieniewski, supra note 17. 
34. /d. 
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III. STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE POSTURING 
The legal issues first arose in the context of state legislation, when wi-fi 
opponents attempted to secure laws forbidding local governments from offering 
the service. Cities naturally countered with judicial challenges - essentially 
non-starters - and later with a possibility more effective approach of preemp-
tive federal bills. The following discussion is somewhat summary in nature, and 
attempts to sketch out only general trends - for the simple reason that every-
thing is likely to change. 
A. State Legislation: A Brief Overview 
1. Constitutional Basis 
The juridical status of state legislative restnctlOn or regulation of munici-
pally operated wi-fi systems is quite straightforward, as a result of a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court decision. In Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League,35 the Court 
upheld a Missouri state prohibition on a municipal offering of any type of "tele-
communications service or telecommunications facility."36 
In 1998, Petitioner Missouri Municipal League and others had requested 
the FCC to preempt the Missouri statute, under section 253(a) of the recently 
passed Telecommunications Act of 1996. This provides that the Commission 
"shall preempt" any state law which "may prohibit or have the effect of prohibit-
ing any entity to provide [sic] any interstate or intrastate telecommunications 
service."37 Mter three years of consideration, the FCC ultimately decided not to 
preempt the Missouri statute, even though three out of the five commissioners 
separately stated the law "disserved" the 1996 Act's policies by decreasing the 
overall amount of competition in the telecommunications market.38 
Although a lengthy discussion of the Missouri League reasoning is not nec-
essary here,39 Justice Souter's majorittO opinion raises some substantial ques-
35. Nixon v. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 128-29 (2004), aifg 299 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(analyzing the scope of Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.410(7)). Missouri Mun. League was one of two conflict-
ing circuit court decisions involving local governmental delivery of telecommunications services. See also 
Abilene v. FCC, 164 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding a Texas statute that barred municipalities 
from providing telecommunications services); Adam Christensen, 'Wi-Fi'ght Them When You Can Join 
Them? How the Philadelphia Compromise May Have Saved Municipally-Owned Telecommunica-
tions Services, 58 FED. COMM. LJ. 683 (2006) (providing an excellent discussion of this line of cases). 
36. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 392.410(7) (West 2006). 
37. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (2006). 
38. Missouri Mun. League, 16 FCC Red 1157, 1158 (2001). Separate statements were issued by Chairman 
Kennard as well as commissioners Tristani and Ness. Id. at 1172-73. Had these commissioners voted in 
accordance with their statements, the Commission's decision thus would have been 3-2 in favor of pre-
empting the Missouri statute. 
39. See Chistensen, supra note 35, at 691-95 (providing a thorough discussion). 
40. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 125-41 (Scalia, ]. and Thomas, J., concurring) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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tions. Its basic thrust is that without state approval, a local government lacks 
either the financial ability or legal authority to run any type of operation. It thus 
concludes that to preempt a state limitation would be "to set off on ... uncertain 
adventures,"41 since a state government would be forced to continue authorizing 
and funding a local telecommunications service even if it disagreed with it. "The 
result, in other words, would be the federal creation of a one-way ratchet. A 
state or municipality could give the power, but it could not take it away later."42 
Justice Souter certainly is correct that federal legislation does not and proba-
bly would not provide either financial support or legal authorization for a local 
governmental telecommunications facility.43 But this does not necessarily end the 
discussion. 
In terms of funding, Justice Souter does not consider the availability of pri-
vate sources. As is the case with local franchising of cable television, all of the 
funding comes from the private entrepreneurs. As noted before,44 at present most 
municipal wi-fi systems involve a partnership of the public and private sectors, 
precisely because local governments - from New York to Taipei - know per-
fectly well that they lack both the capital and expertise to implement wi-fi. 
Moreover, use of private funds to build publicly approved facilities is quite com-
mon in a variety of contexts, ranging from sports arenas to public broadcasting. 
It is thus unclear that a state's financial involvement is essential to building and 
operating a local governmental wi-fi system. 
As to legal authorization, it is equally unclear that a state's involvement is 
necessary in order to make a project feasible. Mter all, a number of state consti-
tutions grant local governments "home rule" powers directly, thus obviating the 
need for a city to seek legislative authorization for a variety of functions.45 To be 
sure, this can result in different results from one state to another - referred to by 
Justice Souter as a "national crazy quilt."46 This country's federalist nature al-
ways has resulted in heterogeneous results, however, in areas outside of exclusive 
federal jurisdiction. Indeed, the creation of federal diversity jurisdiction was 
predicated upon just such considerations.47 
To some extent, the result in Missouri League may have been driven by 
traditional custom and usage on the federal level. The Court long has recognized 
41. /d. at 134. 
42. [d. at 136. 
43. /d. at 133-38. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25. 
45. For example, the New York State Constitution gives expansive home rule powers to municipalities. In 
the early days of cable television franchising - long before the State legislature passed a detailed cable 
regulatory framework - cities relied upon these general powers in regulating cable. E.g., City of New 
York v. Comtel, 293 N'y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1968). 
46. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 136. 
47. See FLE!\ll~G JAMES, JR. ET AI.., CIVIL PROO:DURE 167 (5th ed. 2001). 
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that Congress reserves the ability to limit the operations of agencies which it 
creates - sometimes explicitly to prevent what might be perceived as unfair 
competition to private companies. For example, section 15(d) of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority Act of 1933 explicitly provides for this,48 and the Court has not 
questioned it.49 To a certain extent, the Missouri League Court may have felt 
that states were entitled to the same deference within their areas of competence as 
the federal government was within its. The Court noted that "regulation can 
turn into a public provider's weapon against private competitors,"5o although it 
took pains to exclude this from the merits. 
States thus are constitutionally free to restrict or regulate local governments' 
entry into wi-fi. So far, they have done so in a variety of different fashions. As 
will be seen in Part 2(B), however, the lack of consistency is characteristic of 
reactions to a new and basically unknown technology. 
2. Types of State Regulation 
Current state wi-fi legislation tends to fall into three main categories: (1) 
prohibitions on municipal operation; (2) limitations on types of systems; and (3) 
procedural prerequisites for local governmental market entry. Since states have 
been passing, amending, and repealing these laws on a regular basis, it is impos-
sible to create a definitive list of state legislation.51 Instead, a sampling of each of 
the three approaches may be useful. 
Pennsylvania was one of the early battlegrounds between state and local 
regulation. Verizon and the City of Philadelphia - as well as a number of other 
telecommunications companies and cities - engaged in extensive lobbying 
throughout 2003 and 2004.52 This resulted in both a legislative and a practical 
compromise. The parties ultimately agreed upon a statute preventing a local 
government from offering "advanced or broadband services" unless it had "sub-
mitted a written request for the deployment of such service to the local exchange 
telecommunications company," the latter had not agreed to provide the requested 
services on its own within two months, and the services were not available 
within "14 months of the receipt of the request."53 Although on its face this might 
not seem like much of a compromise, the theory was that the time constraints on 
48. 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4. 
49. Hardin v. Ky. Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1,6 (1968) (noting that one of the Act's purposes was "to protect private 
utilities from TVA competition"). 
50. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 131. 
51. Probably the best ongoing catalog of state wi-fi legislation is available from the Baller Herbst Law 
Group, which updates lists of current and pending laws on a regular basis. See The Baller Herbst Law 
Group, Community Broadband, http://www.baller.comlcomm_broadband.html (last visited Aug. 28, 
2006). 
52. Christensen, supra note 35, at 695-700. 
53. 66 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3014 (2006). 
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the local carrier were sufficiendy stringent to prevent it from exploring a possible 
wi-fi system indefinitely - as carriers have done throughout the world.54 More 
pragmatically, Verizon apparendy made a deal with Philadelphia, its most vocal 
opponent, not to apply for that city's market.55 
A second and somewhat less stringent form of legislation may involve a less 
sweeping form of limitation on local governments. For example, Nebraska legis-
lation prohibits cities from selling telecommunications services generally, but al-
lows them to sell and lease "dark fiber"56 - that is, optical fiber which has not 
been activated and is incapable of carrying information. The rationale behind 
this approach is less than clear, since it involves a city in constructing, but not 
operating, a broadband medium. It may rest on the assumption that the logical 
buyer for dark fiber usually will be a private carrier, and that the partial restric-
tion still prevents a local government from competing for data transmission and 
software support. 
Somewhat similarly, a Tennessee statute prohibits local governments from 
providing "telecommunications services," but explicidy allows them to offer "cable 
service, two-way video transmission, video programming, Internet services, or 
other like service ... "57 Both the meaning and the reasoning of this provision are 
less than clear. A restriction to video services presumably might make some sense, 
by excluding local governments from data transmission markets and restricting 
them to video. Moreover, as noted before,58cable franchises almost universally 
involve a city merely in a supervisory role, with the technological and financial 
benefits accruing to a private entrepreneur. Operation of a modern cable system, 
however, inevitably includes offering cable modem service;59and the statute spe-
cifically allows local governments to offer "Internet service," which would be to-
tally consistent with cable modems. The statute thus appears to be internally 
inconsistent, and not to accomplish its apparent goal of excluding cities from the 
broadband market. 
The third type of restriction is procedural in nature, and may take several 
different forms, the most common of which is a referendum. For example, a 
Colorado statute allows a local government to offer broadband service only after 
"an election . . . on whether or not the local government shall provide the pro-
54. For example, the Australian carrier Telstra spent years planning a national broadband network - much 
like the formerly proposed U.S. "electronic superhighway," - and ultimately dropped the whole project. 
See Botein, supra note 16; Telstra Drops Plan for Australia Network, Dealing a Blow to Akatel, 
WALL ST. }., Aug. 8, 2006, at B3. 
55. Christensen, supra note 35, at 700. 
56. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-593 to -599 (2006). 
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-S2-601(a) (2006). 
58. See supra text accompanying note 43. 
59. See OECD, supra note 12. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's broadband 
study found that nine million U.S. cable subscribers had cable modems. 
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posed . . . service . . . ."60 Louisiana similarly requires "an election . . before 
engaging or offering to engage in performing such services .... "61 By contrast, 
Florida requires a local government to hold two or more "public hearings" before 
offering a "communications service."62 This statute is somewhat more substantive 
than a traditional election or referendum, since it requires a local government to 
make public a "business plan," addressing technological feasibility, capital as well 
as operating costs, and sources of investment and ongoing revenues. This pre-
sumably imposes more of a burden upon a city than a referendum, but may pro-
duce information of use to the government, local public interest groups, and 
potential private operators. 
As this brief review indicates, substantial variations exist in state restric-
tions on municipal wi-fi. This is largely the result of fact that the whole issue is 
new, really only dating from the beginning of the millennium - just like the 
underlying technology.63 States thus are floundering, particularly when caught 
- as in the Philadelphia story - between industry and city lobbies. To this 
extent, Justice Souter's concerns in Missouri League about a "national crazy 
quilt" of state regulatory schemes may have some validity.64 
The uncertain nature of state regulation has brought with it a similarly 
disparate set of reactions from the Congress. Disappointed lobbyists on the state 
level have sought to get some relief from federal authorities. As discussed below, 
this has resulted in a variety of bills pending in the Congress, to confirm, undo, or 
modifY state legislation. 
B. Federal Legislative Initiative 
As of the end of its 2006 session, Congress was considering measures ranging 
from a ban on municipal wi-fi to preemption of all state limitations on municipal 
wi-fi. Once again, trying to create a definitive taxonomy is impossible because of 
the situation's tentative status and the possibilities of political changes during the 
midterm as well as presidential elections. Some examples may be most useful. 
At one end of the spectrum is an outright federal ban on any local govern-
mental provision of telecommunications - including "telecommunications ser-
vice, information service, or cable service . . ." if a private entity supplies any 
"substantially similar service."65 Other than protectionism for commercial opera-
tors, it is difficult to see a basis for this type of measure. 
60. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 29-27-101 to -304 (2006). 
61. LA REV. STAT. ANN. §45:844.56 (2006). 
62. 2005 Fla. Laws ch. 132. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
64. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 135. 
65. Preserving Innovation in Telecom Act of 2005, H.R. 2726, 109th Congo § 2 (1st Sess. 2005). 
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A slightly less draconian approach would prohibit CItIes from using their 
regulatory powers to exclude private entrepreneurs. This would involve require-
ments of public notice as to any proposed communications service, "a detailed 
accounting" of any inherent advantages for a municipal service, "open bids" for 
provision of any service, and a legal "preference for non-governmental entities" 
in the event of "identical bids" - which naturally is quite unlikely with these 
types of high-technology services.66 Like some of the previously discussed state 
statutes,67 this approach imposes some procedural burdens on local governments, 
but it is much less onerous than an outright prohibition. To a real extent, it 
amounts to nothing more than a particularization of traditional competition pol-
icy, by preventing a monopolist (here of governmental authorizations) from re-
fusing to deal.68 
Other proposals would limit state legislatures' activities more directly, by 
preventing them from "prohibiting any public provider . . . from providing . . . 
advanced telecommunications capability or any service .... "69 This approach 
usually also includes a ban on any local governmental activity with the effect of 
discriminating against private entrepreneurs.70 As discussed above,71 this closely 
tracks traditional competition policy and would apply in any event under ex-
isting antitrust law. 72 
A final approach has been to strengthen the FCC's powers to preempt state 
laws for policy grounds, such as finding "substantial and clear efficiencies to be 
gained by preempting the regulatory approach of such State .... "73 This lan-
guage is somewhat more sweeping than the current section 2S3(a) of the Commu-
nications Act, which was at issue in the Missouri League case - and which 
Justice Souter found to be an insufficient basis for preempting the state law at 
issue there.74 It thus is less than clear that just a few years afterwards the Court 
66. Broadband Investment and Consumer Choice Act, S. 1504, 109th Congo § 15 (1st Sess. 2005). 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 53-62. 
68. E.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
69. Community Broadband Act of 2005, S. 1294, 109th Congo § 1 (1st Sess. 2005); see OECD, supra note 
12. Interestingly enough, in his remarks introducing the legislation, Mr. McCain referred to the OECD 
study, and argued that municipal provision of broadband services was essential to preserving the United 
States' competitive position on a global level. 151 CONGo REC. S7298 (daily ed. June 23,2005). This was 
precisely the same argument used by many opponents of local governmental provision of wi-fi and other 
telecommunications services. 
70. Community Broadband Act of 2005, S. 1294, 109th Congo § 1 (1st Sess. 2005); Communications, Con-
sumer's Choice and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, S. 2686, 109th Congo § 501 (2d Sess. 2006). 
Section 501 of S. 2686 is almost identical with section 1 of S. 1294. A bill with very similar language 
passed the House during the Spring of 2006 but showed no signs of life thereafter. See Communications, 
Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement Act of 2006, H.R. 5252, 109th Congo § 401 (2d Sess. 2006). 
71. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
73. Digital Age Communications Act, S. 2113, 109th Congo § 407 (1st Sess. 2005). 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 
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would give a more generous interpretation to a broader statute; presumably Jus-
tice Souter's concerns about a "national crazy quilt" of regulation75 would not 
hinge upon the language of a particular statute. 
As with state legislatures, the Congress shows no particular trend towards 
any consensus. Individual legislators appear to be reacting to a variety of pres-
sures from cities, the RBOCs, and other potential wi-fi players. Time must pass 
before any meaningful trends surface on the federal as well as state level. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As is often the case in dealing with new technologies, the proposed legal 
solutions seem to have outrun the available knowledge. Less than a decade from 
wi-fi's rather humble origins,76 many questions remain unanswered. 
Is there a viable economic market for wi-fi in the first place, in light of how 
much consumers may be willing to pay for yet another data stream?77 To what 
extent does wi-fi compete with wired broadband, such as cable modems and 
DSL? Do municipal wi-fi operators have an unfair competitive advantage over 
private entrepreneurs? What is the model for partnerships between cities and 
private entrepreneurs in providing wi-fi? 
Simply because wi-fi is so new, it may be wise to keep in mind the early 
history of somewhat similar medium: cable television. Although the first cable 
systems began operations in the late 1940s, the FCC did not even consider regu-
lating the industry until the 1960s.78 After the Commission asserted jurisdiction 
in the mid-1960s, in 1968 the Supreme Court approved only a very watered-
down version,79 It took almost two more decades before Congress gave the FCC 
anything resembling a statute with plenary power over cable, in the Cable Act of 
1984.80 By comparison, both litigation and legislation as to municipal wi-fi 
have been moving at a breakneck pace. 
75. Missouri Mun. League, 541 U.S. at 136. 
76. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
77. For example, when the City of Taipei originally launched its municipal wi-fi service on a free basis, it 
had several hundred thousand subscribers within a few months. After imposing a relatively modest 
monthly fee of US$12, however, that number plummeted by ninety percent. The City and its private 
partner are unsure as to maintaining, lowering, or subsidizing the subscription rate. Interview with 
Hon. Ying-jeou Ma, Mayor, City of Taipei, in Taipei, Taiwan (June 29, 2006). 
78. Charles Ferris, Frank Lloyd & Thomas Casey, Cable Television Law: Video Communications Practice 
Guide Sec. 5.03-5.05. 
79. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (holding that the FCC had jurisdiction over cable 
only to the extent that it was "reasonably ancillary" to its regulation - and presumably protection - of 
broadcast television). 
80. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); see Joseph R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz, FCC Cable 
Jurisdiction: From Zero to Plenary in Twenty-Five Years, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 113 (1984). 
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Like everything else in this field, the analogy between wi-fi and cable still is 
less than clear. To the extent that the analogy has any relevance, however, it 
argues strongly for a hands-off approach to municipal wi-fi in the near future. 
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